



onventional wisdom in public policy
dictates that public services should be
delivered as efficiently as possible.
Who would want to “waste” public money,
especially when resources are always scarce?
This maxim is so obvious that we often slide
right by it and move on to more interesting
challenges. When we begin to unpack the
phrase “efficiently as possible,” however, we
quickly run into difficulties. It soon becomes
apparent that the transfer of the concept of
efficiency, understood as productivity, to pub-
lic service delivery creates problems that are
not obvious when private goods and services
are produced and delivered through markets.
What are these problems?
In the relentless drive for increased pro-
ductivity in the public and voluntary sectors,
a drive often fuelled by the need to secure pri-
vate funding and to build public-private part-
nerships, these two sectors have adopted, at
times unwillingly, a rhetoric and a language
of productivity that is considerably narrower
than that of the private sector. They are con-
sequently far less able to provide for unex-
pected contingency, to invest seriously in the
research and development (R&D) that they
need to be productive, and to deal with the
challenges of accountability. I argue that the
language of efficiency, translated narrowly as
productivity and taken to extremes in the
public and voluntary sectors, can compromise
social trust, our sense of social responsibility,
as well as our capacity to be accountable in
meaningful ways, to produce new knowledge
and innovate, and even to prosper.
Efficiency, as I have argued elsewhere,
is not easily applied as an organizing concept
outside the context of markets (Stein 2001).
In the broad public sector, it is often unclear
what we want to be efficient at providing and
how cost-effective services are deﬁned. The
most serious challenge comes, surprisingly,
on the effectiveness side of the cost-effective
equation. There is often widespread dis-
agreement, reinforced by gaps in knowledge
and feedback, about what constitutes an
effective education, or effective health care,
or effective environmental policies. Public-
sector outputs are often multi-dimensional
and the quality of public services is often very
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ly, corrective feedback that markets provide
to the private sector. It is within the context
of this general argument that I examine three
speciﬁc challenges to the delivery of public
services where the public and voluntary sec-
tors suffer particularly badly from the unre-
ﬂexive translation of private-sector language.
The ﬁrst, one that generally receives rel-
atively little attention, is redundancy. When
we are providing public services, we need to
build in some redundancy to cope with unex-
pected contingencies. The unexpected con-
tingency, the shock, the “wild card” can have
far graver consequences when the services are
public rather than private, essential rather
than optional, especially when timelines are
short. We have some knowledge, but not
enough, about appropriate timelines needed
to gear up and deliver public services. And for
reasons that I will make clear, there is far less
tolerance for redundancy in the public and
voluntary sectors than in the private sector.
The second challenge to increased pro-
ductivity is the need for a strong base of
research and innovation to improve the effec-
tiveness, as well as the delivery, of public serv-
ices. We know that signiﬁcant investment in
R&D is a critical requirement for improving
productivity, particularly in that part of the pri-
vate sector that produces capital goods. In a
global “knowledge-based” economy, where
knowledge has become among the most impor-
tant resources, leading ﬁrms in the telecom-
munications sector and in computer hardware
and software, for example, attach even greater
signiﬁcance than they did two decades ago to
investment in R&D. It is not only ﬁrms that
produce capital goods, however, that are sig-
niﬁcant investors. Throughout the private sec-
tor, ﬁrms invest in research to stimulate
innovation and increase productivity in their
delivery of goods and services. When we look
at the public sector and the voluntary sector, we
ﬁnd signiﬁcant constraints on their capacity to
invest in the production of knowledge they
need to improve their cost-effectiveness.
Ironically, these constraints often come from
the private-sector demand for cost-contain-
ment in the other two sectors.
The third challenge is the absence of the
easily available corrective feedback that mar-
kets generally provide to producers of private
goods. Without feedback, it is difficult to
determine how productive the public and vol-
untary sectors are. Public services at times
seem to fall into a “black hole.” To deal with
this problem, policy-makers are turning
increasingly to accountability as a surrogate
for market feedback. But accountability includes
far more than the feedback markets generally
provide. We are not clear what we mean by
accountability: do we include only “upward”
accountability, or “outward” accountability as
well? Is accountability system-wide or individ-
ual? Some argue that personal accountability
rests on a useful myth: the “social convention
and construction by which political actors
affirm the preeminence of intentional human
control over history” (March and Olsen 1995,
157-158, 161).
1 To make matters even more
complicated, constructing systems of account-
ability is also “expensive.” This should come
as no surprise to economists who understand
the costs of the structures we have built to reg-
ulate markets. It is a (relatively) straightfor-
ward matter, however, to offset the costs of
market regulation against the anticipated costs
of widespread cheating and destabilization of
markets for private goods and services. Alas,
the problem becomes far more complicated in
the public and voluntary sectors.
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Before considering these three chal-
lenges, I want to brieﬂy situate productivity
within the different meanings of efficiency.
These differences, as we shall see, are not triv-
ial, for they have quite different implications
for the delivery of public services. We usual-
ly understand efficiency as the best possible
use of scarce resources to achieve a valued end.
Efficiency generally means productivity, or
cost-effectiveness, where the maximum
amount of output is produced from a given
set of resources, or a given output is produced
with fewer resources.
2 Productivity increases,
for example, when people make better use of
the resources they have, including their time,
to increase the quantity of work that they can
accomplish while maintaining the quality.
Embedded in the concept of produc-
tivity is an assessment of quality and effec-
tiveness as well as quantity. As I have argued
elsewhere, judgements about effectiveness —
extraordinarily difficult to make and always
subject to political contestation and debate
— must logically precede any calculation of
productivity (Stein 2001). It is no accident
that productivity is often deﬁned as cost-
effectiveness. It relates cost to effectiveness.
The concept of productivity, when it is
applied to the delivery of public services, is
not without its contradictions. Consider for
a moment the example of hospitals that, in
the last decade, have signiﬁcantly increased
their productivity. Their cost per weighted
patient has dropped as acutely ill patients
cycle through more quickly, usually without
adverse consequences. Hospitals, in other
words, are treating patients more efficiently
than they did a decade ago and, consequent-
ly, can handle larger numbers of patients.
But absolute costs are rising, since most of
the costs of treating acute illness occur at the
beginning of the hospital stay. The most effi-
cient hospitals, those with the lowest costs
per weighted patients, therefore tend to run
the largest deﬁcits. The government funding
formula rewards efficient hospitals only at the
margin and, consequently, hospitals ﬁnd them-
selves trapped in the “efficiency squeeze.”
Within current constraints, the logic is clear:
hospitals that want to increase their productiv-
ity should admit fewer patients and close beds.
We could argue that if productivity
were applied to the health-care system as a
whole, rather than to just one silo, and if
government funding genuinely rewarded
productivity, some of these contradictions
would disappear. Meeting these conditions,
however, would require a widespread trans-
formation of the health-care system; the
removal of existing silos among hospitals,
physicians, chronic care and home care; the
creation of an integrated system; and a fun-
damental change in government funding for-
mulae. One would not have to be a cynic to
conclude that these kinds of fundamental
changes are not yet visible on the policy hori-
zon. In their absence, hospitals will continue
to struggle with the perverse consequences of
the efficiency squeeze created by the use of
productivity measures in their sector.
It is not only that productivity creates
unintended contradictions and negative exter-
nalities when it is used within segments of pub-
lic-service sectors as a measure of efficiency. As
Joseph Heath argues convincingly in his chap-
ter in this volume, productivity does not nec-
essarily equate to welfare. On the contrary, he
insists, the costs of productivity are often under-
stated and its beneﬁts exaggerated. This appar-
ent paradox is less puzzling when we consider
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broader utilitarian tradition that speaks of max-
imizing satisfaction rather than the number of
outputs for a given input. Using microeco-
nomic models, we think of individuals as
“rational” when they make choices that increase
their welfare. Welfare is deﬁned not only in
material terms, but also includes the moral,
psychological and spiritual satisfaction people
get from the consequences of the choices they
make. What matters is whether people have
made the choice that best satisﬁes their needs,
whatever their needs may be. Here, efficiency,
rationality and satisfaction are all conﬂated.
Efficiency as the maximization of utili-
ty or satisfaction is quite different from effi-
ciency used to describe increased productivity.
The two are frequently confused. Productivity
requires some external standard — how many
doctoral students does a university graduate,
and at what cost — while utilitarian argu-
ments depend on internal standards like sat-
isfaction and utility. We may increase our
productivity but signiﬁcantly reduce our util-
ity. The familiar contradiction between the
increased productivity of coal-burning fur-
naces and environmental damage is only one
among a host of such examples. If the reduced
quality of the air matters more to us than the
gain in productivity, then we have diminished
our utility. An increase in productivity would
consequently be inefficient. This is precisely
the compelling argument that Heath makes.
The concept of efficiency deﬁned as the pur-
suit of self-interest is much broader than the
concept of productivity that economists use to
explain economic growth. The two are not at
all equivalent.
When we discuss “efficiency” in con-
nection with public rather than private serv-
ices, we need to be especially clear. We need
to be clear not only because markets gener-
ally do not provide feedback, but, even more
to the point, because the collective stakes are
so high. Are we discussing the productivity
of the public sector, or do we mean satisfac-
tion with public services? Is satisfaction —
an inherently subjective concept — concep-
tually and technically equivalent to welfare?
And if we mean satisfaction, is it individual
satisfaction with schools, health care, public
transportation and policing, or collective sat-
isfaction? And if it is collective satisfaction
— a hotly contested issue — is it satisfaction
of only “citizen-consumers,” or providers as
well? How do we think about those individ-
uals and groups within the collectivity who
are dissatisﬁed? Do the reasons for dissatis-
faction matter? Should those who are dissat-
isﬁed with some public services be permitted
to opt out and purchase them privately if
they can afford to do so? What is the appro-
priate balance, to use economists’ language,
between the negative and positive externali-
ties of this kind of policy? Do those who are
dissatisﬁed because they do not have full
access to public services deserve special con-
sideration and additional help?
Often, we are not clear in our thinking
about efficiency. As we begin to peel away
the layers of the concept, it becomes more
and more difficult to remain strictly within
the conﬁnes of economic analysis. Deciding
which is the appropriate concept and criteri-
on of efficiency when public services are at
stake is often a deeply political decision.
How we balance the at times contradictory
imperatives of productivity and satisfaction
(or welfare) is a political choice. And how we
think — as citizens as well as scholars —
about opportunity costs is only partly
informed by economic analysis, since exter-
262
Janice Gross Stein
Janice Stein text  11/27/02  2:20 PM  Page 262nalities extend far into the future. The longer
our collective time horizon, the more diffi-
cult these externalities are to estimate, espe-
cially since we rarely have the kind of
baseline probability distributions that such
estimates assume. As societies, in other
words, we often gamble, without the proba-
bility distributions that gamblers can use in
games of chance. How we calculate the odds
and make our bets is as much a function of
our politics and of our concept of citizenship
as it is of economic analysis.
To make matters simpler, for purposes
of this chapter I use efficiency to mean only
productivity. And, in examining the transfer
of language from the private sector to public
services, I look not only at the public sector
— the traditional provider — but also at
not-for-proﬁt organizations in the voluntary
sector that increasingly deliver public serv-
ices that were once provided by the state.
3
“To a large measure,” Chris Miller observes,
“they are engaged in the delivery of state-
deﬁned public services, not as a supplement
to state provision but as a main provider”
(1998, 414). How the voluntary sector is
deﬁned, and whether it exists as a sector, is
the subject of considerable controversy.
4 Most
deﬁnitions exclude unmediated acts of vol-
unteering and focus on organizations that are
not-for-proﬁt, signiﬁcantly engage volunteers
and are independent of other organizations
(Dreessen and Reed 2000).
5These criteria would
include charitable organizations and other not-
for-proﬁt organizations in the voluntary sector
that deliver public services and exclude hospi-
tals, universities and schools that are heavily
funded by government and have statutory sta-
tus (Sharpe 1994). Conventionally, these are
included in the “broader public sector.”
6
I argue that we use the same language
across the three sectors, but the language
often has very different meanings. The prob-
lem is not simply one of poor translation
from the private to the other two sectors. The
inconsistencies in the meaning of productiv-
ity mask a deeper problem: leaders in the pri-
vate sector have exported the concept of
productivity to the public and voluntary sec-
tors, but, in their simultaneous insistence on
cost-containment in the sectors that provide
public services, they are generally critical of
increases in spending, even when spending
on R&D, for example, is an important com-
ponent of improved productivity. The prob-
lem is not simply one of poor translation of
concepts as they travel across sectors. It is a
far deeper problem of double standards.
REDUNDANCY, PRODUCTIVITY
AND SATISFACTION
On September 11, most of the ﬁrms
housed in the World Trade Center were
operational again within a few hours. With
only a few exceptions, data were not lost, key
personnel were in place and ﬁrms were able
to transmit from makeshift headquarters.
That there was so little disruption is largely
a function of the “redundancy” that many of
the large ﬁrms had built into their opera-
tions. It was not only that they had backed
up their data systems; most institutions in all
three sectors do so routinely. They also
backed up their most fundamental resource,
their people (Coffey 2002). Essential person-
nel were identiﬁed, and in some cases
replacement personnel were assigned in the
event of an emergency. After the attack on
the World Trade Center in 1993, many of
the ﬁrms moved emergency command-and-
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a second attack. These kinds of capacities
existed not only among ﬁrms in the World
Trade Center, who understandably might
have taken such precautions, but more broad-
ly throughout the ﬁnancial sector. The large
banks in downtown Toronto, for example,
had built in similar kinds of safeguards.
Redundancy is usually understood as
excess — unproductive — capacity. Capacity
may be redundant because it has no present or
foreseeable productive use. When we speak of
a redundant capacity to deal with contingency,
however, this kind of capacity is expressly
designed to duplicate in case of breakdown or
to meet unanticipated needs. The ﬁrst kind of
redundancy is clearly a drag on productivity,
with few imaginable beneﬁts. The second kind
of redundancy reﬂects familiar precautionary or
insurance logic, where we incur costs to protect
against an improbable but highly damaging
contingency. Unlike other insurance problems,
when “redundant” headquarters were con-
structed away from the World Trade Center it
was impossible to estimate the likelihood that a
second attack would occur, since there were no
reliable baseline probabilities. It would have
been impossible to calculate the costs and
beneﬁts ex ante of the decision to establish and
maintain off-site headquarters, since the proba-
bilities of future attacks were unknown. The
costs of doing so were known, but the beneﬁts
were hypothetical. Before the fact, we could
make no determination that establishing emer-
gency headquarters off-site was efficient. We
could not even conclude that the policy was
instrumentally rational: if, for example, no
attack had occurred for 50 years, would we
think that the costs incurred were justiﬁed?
If this seems to be a frivolous question in
the wake of the subsequent attack on the
World Trade Center, consider our retrospec-
tive evaluation of Y2K-related expenditure in
early 2001. Billions of dollars were spent, in
both the private and the public sector, to ﬁx
the anticipated problem. When signiﬁcant dis-
ruption did not occur, commentators began to
complain about the unnecessary expenditure
and the drag of those expenditures on produc-
tivity that became apparent the following year.
Some attributed malevolent motives to the
computer sector; it had overblown the prob-
lem and artiﬁcially stimulated demand and
unnecessary expenditure.
7 Yet it was the elab-
orate preparations for Y2K and the built-in
redundancy that enabled most of the large
ﬁrms across the ﬁnancial sector to resume oper-
ations as quickly as they did in September
2001. Even ﬁnancial ﬁrms that were not phys-
ically disrupted immediately went into “Y2K
mode” to protect against further disruption. As
a CEO of a large ﬁnancial services ﬁrm in
Toronto put it to me, “As we dispersed our
personnel on the morning of September 11th,
Y2K saved us. We all knew exactly where to
go and what to do, and had all the backup per-
sonnel and procedures in place.”
Firms in the private sector have shown lit-
tle compunction in the last ﬁve years in build-
ing in redundancy to back up both their
essential operating systems and human resources
so that they could continue to deliver basic
goods and services in the event of an unexpected
contingency. In this case, they were relatively
unconstrained by short-term considerations of
productivity. It was this redundancy that proved
extraordinarily valuable in a contingency that
few could have imagined, much less predicted.
Firms made these decisions to protect the part
of their operations that they considered essential.
Building in redundancy consequently becomes
an indicator of importance and priority.
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tor could justify a similar kind of investment in
redundancy. On the contrary, redundancy was
almost always synonymous with “inefficiency.” In
Canada, hospitals with “redundant” emergency
and trauma capacity were considered inefficient.
Public-health facilities built in almost no redun-
dancy to cope with large-scale emergencies, as
political leaders discovered to their chagrin in the
wake of September 11 and accelerated fears of bio-
logical warfare.
8 A decade ago, “surplus” nurses
were dismissed wholesale; today, the shortage of
nurses is one of the most severe constraints on the
productivity of the health-care system. Public per-
sonnel with expertise in water safety were reduced,
even though the public generally considers safe
water an essential public good. Much of this was
done to increase short-term productivity.
9
One can make the argument that simi-
lar practices occurred in the private sector.
Large-scale dismissal of personnel in the tech-
nology sector, for example, has followed the
downturn in technology stocks over the last
few years. Henry Mintzberg and his colleagues,
in a trenchant analysis of the “culture of self-
ishness” that enables these kinds of dismissals,
argues that in the last decade corporations have
lost their capacity to balance the legitimate
claims of all their stakeholders and now
respond ﬁrst and foremost to shareholders
(Mintzberg 2002; Mintzberg et al. 2002). A
short-term focus on market valuation of shares
interferes with the capacity to invest over the
long term to increase productivity and reduces
the capacity of senior executives to manage
effectively. The negative consequences of wide-
spread dismissal are real, but they are only part
of the story, for few large corporations engaged
in widespread dismissal of core personnel in
what they considered to be their essential serv-
ices. Not so in the public sector.
There are exceptions. Arguments for
redundancy are, of course, widely accepted when
it comes to security and defence. We generally
invest in the armed forces, intelligence agencies
and policing even when perceived threats to secu-
rity are low. Here, arguments for productivity do
not trump all other arguments, but are balanced
against others. We make these “unproductive”
investments over time for several reasons. First,
the state has been deﬁned for the last three cen-
turies by its capacity to provide security from
attack. It is the priority, the “core business” of the
state. We recognize the large consequences of
failures of readiness in a contingency that we can-
not currently predict or imagine. We also recog-
nize the long lead time needed to develop
capabilities and acknowledge that we cannot put
the required capabilities in place once an emer-
gency is upon us. Even when we anticipate a
“peace dividend,” we no longer reduce our invest-
ment in these kinds of capabilities below what we
consider a critical threshold.
We seem to be highly selective in our
thinking about public services. We do not, for
example, insure against environmental catas-
trophe by building in “backup” capacity the
way we do against military attack, even though
arguably the consequences could be as cata-
strophic. Globally, we do not build redundant
capacity to treat multi-bacteria-resistant dis-
eases or viral epidemics, even though the fatal-
ities from AIDS are now anticipated to exceed
those of all the wars of the last century. In other
words, with the exception of the priority status
we give to security and defence, we generally
pay less attention to the possibility that public
services will be severely disrupted than do lead-
ing private-sector ﬁrms responding to market
imperatives.
I ﬁnd this pattern deeply puzzling. It is
especially surprising given the long lead time
265
Bad Translation or Double Standard?: Productivity and Accountability 
Across the Private, Public and Voluntary Sectors
Janice Stein text  11/27/02  2:20 PM  Page 265required to build up essential services in the
public sector. We understand that we need
trained militaries with appropriate capabili-
ties even if they are not being currently used.
Yet we do not extend this kind of thinking to
nurses, for example, an essential building
block of the health-care system.
10
It is no small irony that attention to con-
tingency and tolerance for backup is far greater
in the private sector than in the public sector,
which provides the private sector as well as the
public with services that are essential and that
the market is unlikely to provide. It is remark-
able, when we stop to think about it, that
“insurance-like thinking” is more acceptable
in the private sector, despite its commitment
to productivity. The analogy of insurance-like
thinking is illuminating, for we generally
insure what is most important to us and what
we cannot afford to replace if it is destroyed,
even if the probability of loss is low. Large
ﬁrms in the private sector identify core capac-
ities and personnel, what is essential, what they
cannot afford to lose, even if the probability of
loss is low, and build in redundancy without
close attention to productivity measured along
short-time horizons.
When the services are public, we do far
less well in identifying core capacities, and suc-
cumb to thinking about short-term productiv-
ity as if it were the only criterion. In this
respect, we are more extreme in the “culture of
selﬁshness” than the private sector. The public
and voluntary sectors cannot and should not
back up all their programs and all the staff that
deliver public services. They too need a precau-
tionary principle that identiﬁes public services
that are essential in an environment of uncer-
tainty where risk cannot, by deﬁnition, be cal-
culated with conﬁdence. They can and should
make decisions about what are essential public
services and build in the critical backup they
need to deal with unforeseen contingency. The
criteria for these decisions need public discus-
sion and debate, for inevitably some difficult
choices will have to be made. Here, the trade-
off between efficiency and welfare is clear:
devoting increased resources to these kinds of
public services will inevitably reduce produc-
tivity, but may well increase welfare.
Most importantly, we should not hold
these two sectors to a stricter standard in terms
of efficiency, a standard urged on governments
by the private sector over the last decade even
while it budgeted for important contingencies.
Decisions about where we build in redundan-
cy are clearly deeper signals about what we as a
society consider basic and what we consider
expendable. They should be read that way.
PRODUCTIVITY AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and development is one of the
keys to gains in productivity. Traditionally,
it has been through the innovation that
grows out of R&D that the private sector
improves the effectiveness of the goods and
services it delivers, brings new and better
products on line, and improves the cost-effec-
tiveness of management, production and
delivery systems. Leading-edge corporations
have often captured market share as a result
of signiﬁcant investment in R&D. It would
be inconceivable today for any globally com-
petitive ﬁrm to make no serious investment
of this kind. Generally, a norm of at least 5
percent of total expenditure prevails, but
many of the leading ﬁrms surpass this level.
Within large ﬁrms, there is no expec-
tation that R&D divisions be productively
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they are expected to generate beneﬁts that
diffuse throughout the ﬁrm and improve per-
formance across the organization. They are
evaluated not through an “internal” measure
of productivity but through their contribu-
tion to the productivity of the ﬁrm as a
whole. It is well acknowledged, moreover,
that investment in R&D may increase pro-
ductivity only in the long term, with nega-
tive implications for short-term productivity.
In the last decade the public sector has
begun to learn this lesson, but in a very limited
and skewed way. Political leaders have acknowl-
edged the lagging performance in R&D in the
private sector in many countries and acted to
stimulate better performance. In Canada, for
example, governments have recognized the
importance of innovation to economic perform-
ance and have begun to invest to promote part-
nerships among the corporate sector, research
institutes and universities to enhance R&D.
Most of this investment, however, focuses on the
development from basic research of spin-off
goods and services that can be taken to market.
The private sector has often been a willing
member of the new partnerships created and
partially funded by government. Here, it has not
called for a reduction in government spending.
Even though governments now accept
the importance of investment in R&D for the
economy as a whole, they have invested alarm-
ingly little themselves in in-house research on
how public services can be improved and in
centres of excellence that work on innovation
in the public sector. If anything, over the last
two decades political leaders have reduced the
capacity for policy analysis, the analogue in the
public sector to R&D, in order to reduce costs.  
There are, of course, important excep-
tions, largely within the “broader public sec-
tor.” New institutes to gather information on
the performance of the health-care sector have
been established, and consequently we do have
much better information than we had a decade
ago.
11 We can at least map the ﬁeld of health
care with some conﬁdence. There has been rel-
atively little public investment in innovation
in health care, however, despite its centrality
as a public good and as a component of gov-
ernment spending. A parallel in the private
sector would be difficult to ﬁnd. It is almost
inconceivable that ﬁrms would make no seri-
ous investment in innovation in an area that
constituted 40 percent of the goods and serv-
ices they supplied to the market.
Inside government, the reduction in
capacity for research and policy analysis in the
last ﬁfteen years is striking. The most visible
examples were the closing of some of the most
important centres of research and analysis by
provincial and federal governments; the
Economic Council of Canada, the Science
Council of Canada, the Law Reform Commission
and the Ontario Economic Council are among
the best known. Inside almost every major
department of the federal government, the size
of policy units was frozen or reduced, signiﬁ-
cantly reducing the capacity of government to
do research and serious program evaluation. This
reduction in analytical capacity occurred at the
same time as governments were contracting out
and downloading service delivery, leaving as
their principal responsibility policy analysis and
development. In short, governments strangled
their capacity for policy research and develop-
ment even as that became their “core business.”
Senior officials in central agencies now bemoan
the serious erosion of R&D capacity.
If governments have reduced their
capacity to generate the knowledge they need
to improve the cost-effectiveness of public
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constrained. The “third” sector has become
an essential component in the delivery of
public services as the state has retreated from
the ﬁeld over the last decade (Miller 1998;
Panet and Trebilcock 1996).
12 Yet it has been
severely limited in its capacity to invest in
the knowledge it needs to improve its per-
formance and to assess the cost-effectiveness
of the public services that it provides.
Responding to pressures for productivi-
ty from its funders, the voluntary sector has
moved to reduce its administrative costs as a
proportion of the funds it raises and spends.
Agencies often compete to achieve the lowest
proportion of administrative costs per dollar
spent on the delivery of goods and services and
then proudly claim to be the most efficient.
This kind of calculation ignores the
effectiveness component of the cost-effective-
ness equation that constitutes productivity.
As agencies race to reduce costs — and there-
fore staff — in response to pressure, they are
less and less able to evaluate the effectiveness
of the programs they deliver. They cannot
learn systematically from their failures or their
successes and develop a code of best practices
that is constantly updated as new research
becomes available. Individual agencies deliv-
ering services, especially the smaller agencies
that serve local communities by now have
almost no capacity to do this kind of work,
but there has been almost no central coordi-
nation of investment in research and knowl-
edge generation. Nor is there sustained
capacity to share knowledge across the sector.
13
Research that is commissioned is currently
charged as an administrative cost and treated
as overhead, a drag on productivity, rather
than as an investment in improving produc-
tivity. Somehow, the formula of the private
sector has been turned on its head when fun-
ders think about the voluntary sector.
The voluntary sector is largely unable to
make the kind of investment in R&D that is
taken for granted in the private sector. As ﬁrms
within the private sector move to become
“learning organizations,” leaders of many of
these same ﬁrms have pressed hard for greater
efficiency — translated as lower overhead — in
the voluntary sector. Efficiency is translated as
cost-containment rather than as improved per-
formance in the work of agencies in the com-
munity. Consequently, the lag in the voluntary
sector in R&D is stunning. It is no surprise that
the pace of innovation is consequently slower
and a signiﬁcant impediment to improved pro-
ductivity.
14 It is no exaggeration to suggest that
as long as investment in R&D is considered a
cost, a drag on productivity, rather than a spur
to innovation and cost-effectiveness, the volun-
tary sector will be imprisoned within a hol-
lowed-out concept of efficiency.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY
Accountability in the private sector
seems relatively straightforward in compari-
son to that in the public and voluntary sec-
tors. The word accountability derives from the
old French term comptes à rendre, or the ren-
dering of accounts (Dubnik 1998, 68;
Keohane 2002). The private sector renders
accounts to markets, and markets in turn
depend in large part on the release of accurate
information by corporations. Markets need
accurate information to know only whether
ﬁrms are proﬁtable. They do not need to
know whether the goods and services that
ﬁrms supply are as effective as they can be for
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satisfy their customers or they will go out of
business, so they are constantly trying to
improve the quality and value of the goods
and services that they sell. The challenge is to
improve quality while remaining proﬁtable.
In the wake of the scandals surrounding
Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom, seri-
ous challenges to corporate concepts of account-
ability have begun to capture widespread public
attention. Concern among scholarly observers
of corporate accountability, however, has been
growing for over a decade. The issue is not
only the accuracy of information that ﬁrms
release, but the larger problem of the increas-
ingly narrow criteria of accountability. A cul-
ture of selﬁshness, Mintzberg argues, has
created a narrow view of society as an aggre-
gation of “homo economicus,” and a distorted
concept of accountability, where ﬁrms are
principally accountable to shareholders. No
longer are customers central, except as pur-
chasers of goods and services, nor are employ-
ees critical, again except as contributors
directly to the proﬁtability of the corporation
and indirectly to the value of the shares. A
decade ago, Mintzberg argues, shareholders
were traditionally residual claimants on the
corporation, after obligations to customers and
employees had been met. Now, the share-
holder has become the immediate and, at
times, the only locus of corporate accounta-
bility (Mintzberg 2002).
Not only has the locus of corporate
accountability shifted and narrowed, but
time horizons have shrunk. Investors respond
increasingly to quarterly reports, and as
shareholders become the most important
focus of accountability, corporate decisions
respond to shrinking horizons, with less and
less capacity to invest to increase productiv-
ity over the long term at the cost of short-
term losses. Ironically, the hollowed-out con-
cept of efficiency exported by the private
sector to the other two sectors has now cycled
back to haunt many corporate leaders and
their employees. These narrowed concepts of
efficiency and accountability have translated
into cost-reduction when proﬁts fall and dras-
tic reduction of non-essential staff. It is not
surprising that employees feel less and less
loyal to their employers. The long-term
results may well be troubling: less commit-
ment, lower productivity over the long term
and a reduced capacity to innovate, as even
valuable employees have every incentive to
move on when new opportunities arise.
The evolution of concepts of corporate
accountability is more complex than analysis
of ﬁrms alone would suggest. Even as account-
ability has narrowed to respond largely to
investors and markets, there has been a grow-
ing emphasis on corporate “social responsibil-
ity,” the responsibilities of corporations to
society as a whole (Forcese 1997; Held et al.
1999; Project on Canadian Democracy and
Corporate Accountability 2002). It is no accident
that the language is one of social “responsibili-
ty” rather than accountability, for responsibility
is both a more demanding and a less explicit
concept than accountability. Responsibility
derives at times from authorization by others
to act, at times from representation, but more
often from internalized values, which motivate
people to act according to these norms and val-
ues, whether or not they are held speciﬁcally
accountable.
Locally and globally, sometimes willing-
ly and sometimes under considerable pressure,
corporate leaders have begun to acknowledge
their responsibility to contribute to the protec-
tion of the environment, to fairer labour prac-
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tories around the world and to the improve-
ment of communities where they operate
(Rovere 2000). Corporate leaders have moved
beyond the traditional pattern of charitable
investment in culture and the arts to play
important roles — for example, in sponsoring
educational opportunities for disadvantaged
youth and in rebuilding decaying cities. More
and more, they are coming to the table with the
other sectors to negotiate agreements on norms
and shared practices that are “responsible.”
Outside the corporate sector, there is a growing
demand for the “social audit” of ﬁrms.
I term this kind of accountability “out-
ward,” in contrast to the more traditional
model of “upward” accountability.
15 Upward
or vertical accountability encompasses tradi-
tional principal-agent relationships in which
one has superior authority to the other: gov-
ernments to publics, corporate executives to
boards, subordinates to superiors. Outward or
horizontal accountability, which is much clos-
er to concepts of responsibility, occurs among
relative equals with no formal reporting rela-
tionships: different sectors of society coming
together to solve shared problems, networks
that link multiple nodes together in lateral
relationships. It is this kind of accountability,
at times animated by shared norms, at times
motivated by the prospect of sanctions, that is
beginning to enter corporate discourse.
How sectors integrate and balance the at
times complementary and at times competing
demands of upward and outward accountabil-
ity gives meaning and content to the broader
concept of responsibility. Leaders in the cor-
porate sector, for example, are often caught
between demands of shareholders for con-
stantly increasing value and their accountabil-
ity to other sectors and society as a whole.
I skip over the challenges of political
accountability, in large part because these chal-
lenges have been the subject of serious and sus-
tained public and scholarly investigation. The
problems are well mapped. Accountability in
the public sector at ﬁrst glance seems to be
straightforward, at least in democratic politi-
cal systems. Through representation and dele-
gation of authority, political leaders are
empowered to act, but they are responsible to
those who elect them. It hardly needs saying,
however, that citizens are increasingly dissat-
isﬁed with their capacity to hold their govern-
ments accountable in meaningful ways. The
“democratic deﬁcit” has been the subject of an
enormous amount of investigation and discus-
sion, and proposals for enhancing political
accountability are rife. In the last two decades,
as governments have moved to private-public
partnerships to deliver public services, in part
to become more productive, the problem of
accountability has become even more acute.
Governments and citizens are struggling with
new kinds of outward accountability even as
the traditional forms of upward accountabili-
ty remain inadequate.
The challenges of accountability in the
voluntary sector have received much less scholar-
ly and public attention. Governments have
devolved the delivery of public services not only
to the private sector, but also to the voluntary sec-
tor, and in the process have layered new problems
of accountability over already existing difficulties.
In Canada, the federal government funded and
created the Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI), a
partnership between the government and vol-
untary-sector leaders to improve service delivery,
to increase the capacity of the sector and to
reform its regulation. The focus is on fairer and
more transparent registration of charities so that
they are more accountable, and the reform of
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on advocacy (Brock 2001; Institute for Media,
Policy and Civil Society 2001, 2002; Panel on
Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary
Sector, 1999). Voluntary organizations are
expected to be productive in the way they deliv-
er goods and services as well as transparent and
accountable.
The demand from donors, funders and
government for accountability on the part of
the voluntary sector is reasonable and appro-
priate. It is inconceivable that the voluntary
sector, alone among the three sectors, would
not meet the demands for productivity and
upward accountability that the other sectors
are required to meet. As we unpack the lan-
guage of accountability in the voluntary sec-
tor and decode its meaning, however, we
gradually come to see its dark side.
Accountability requires, at a mini-
mum, performance set against a standard.
The ﬁrst issue is how the standard is deter-
mined. We have seen that the voluntary sec-
tor has not been able, as it has struggled to
reduce its administrative costs, to make the
investment in R&D proportionate to those of
the other two sectors. The knowledge base
for standards of performance is much thinner
in this sector than it is in the other two. The
loop between outcomes and performance has
not received the same kind of careful inves-
tigation and research.
16 This sector, moreover,
has generally not had the resources to share
best practices as well as the private and pub-
lic sectors. Determination of an appropriate
standard consequently becomes much more
problematic.
In the absence of a strong knowledge
base, the relevant question then becomes who
sets the standard — is it the funder, the organ-
ization or agency, or the client? Internationally,
global ﬁnancial institutions have moved
aggressively to set uniform standards of per-
formance to increase productivity, and often
have established criteria of accountability, with
little attention to the knowledge and experi-
ence of the non-governmental organizations
that deliver the programs. The World Bank,
for example, aggressively urged the marketi-
zation of health-care services in many poorer
countries in the mid-1990s. Local NGOs were
held to strict measures of outputs, despite their
warnings that much of what they would
accomplish was unsustainable because the nec-
essary local infrastructure was lacking, espe-
cially in the countryside. NGOs often found
themselves trapped between the standards of
large institutional funders and the needs of the
communities they served. In this sense, they
were caught, and at times caught deeply,
between upward accountability for productiv-
ity and outward responsibility. The former is
in direct tension with the latter.
The same kinds of dilemmas arise
within Canada, although not as acutely. As
governments have stepped back from service
delivery, it is the voluntary sector that has
largely ﬁlled the gap, sometimes with and
sometimes without government funding.
When governments do fund, they set stan-
dards of performance and, sometimes in con-
sultation with agencies and sometimes not,
set the benchmarks for performance. Local
agencies, with deep knowledge of their com-
munities, ﬁnd themselves caught between
funder-imposed standards and their sense of
responsibility to the communities they serve.
The creation of standards of accounta-
bility is complicated further by the issue of
appropriate time horizons for evaluation. For
programs that deliver very speciﬁc services to
identiﬁable communities, timelines are not a
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to address complex social problems and to
build capacity, appropriate timelines become
problematic in any scheme of accountability.
If timelines are too short for a proper assess-
ment, then upward accountability again com-
petes directly with outward responsibility.
Local agencies are forced to abandon programs
and the people they serve, despite their engage-
ment with the community and their deep
knowledge of local needs.
17
In considering accountability, there are
intriguing parallels between the private and
voluntary sectors. The private sector exported
its language of productivity to the voluntary
sector, but in the translation the concept was so
narrowed that it came to mean the lowest
administrative cost. The push to cut adminis-
trative costs reduces the capacity to invest in the
research that is required not only to innovate
but also to evaluate and to be held accountable.
It also reduces the capacity to engage over
longer time horizons and puts at risk commu-
nity trust when agencies are forced to withdraw.
In other words, responsibility is compromised
by the demands of accountability. One of the
pernicious consequences of a sense of compro-
mised responsibility is an appreciable decline
in satisfaction (or welfare), both within the
agency and within the community. The push
for accountability, using narrowly deﬁned stan-
dards of productivity, is inefficient.
Ironically, these problems are not dis-
similar to the challenges faced by corporations
operating in a “culture of selﬁshness,”where
they are accountable principally to sharehold-
ers. Here too, short-term accountability to
shareholders reduces the capacity to engage over
longer time horizons and destroys commitment
and trust among employees. Here too, corpo-
rate leaders face an increasingly intensiﬁed con-
ﬂict between accountability and responsibility.
The signiﬁcant difference is their capacity to
invest in R&D and protect their knowledge
base for subsequent rebuilding and innovation.
CONCLUSION
When we look at the organizing lan-
guage of the private sector, productivity
looms large. The language of the private sec-
tor was exported to the public and voluntary
sectors, but it did not travel well. Joseph
Heath argues in this volume that a single-
minded focus on productivity does not nec-
essarily contribute to increased welfare. To
make matters worse, as it travelled to the
other two sectors, the concept of productivi-
ty was narrowed even further.
The other two sectors are constrained
from making investments to deal with con-
tingencies that may threaten or overwhelm
their capacity to deliver public services, the
voluntary sector even more than the public
sector. They are also constrained in their
capacity to invest in R&D, to build the
knowledge they need and to innovate. Again,
the voluntary sector is far more limited than
the public sector. This knowledge gap com-
promises the capacity for program evaluation
and for meaningful participation in the
development of appropriate standards of
accountability. Upwardly dictated accounta-
bility, aggravated by signiﬁcant knowledge
gaps, compromises responsibility.
It is not without irony that the private
sector, after a decade of excess, is now begin-
ning to confront some of the same challenges.
Here too, productivity has been distorted and
accountability so narrowly deﬁned that it has
been hollowed out. And here too, the sense
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have trust and commitment.
We know that trust and commitment
are the social glue that holds our societies
together (Putnam 1993). Those societies that
have high levels of trust and commitment tend
to prosper, while those that face deﬁcits in social
trust do not. The moral of this story may be
that the language of productivity, narrowed and
taken to extremes, can compromise social trust,
our sense of social responsibility, our capacity
to be accountable, our capacity to produce new
knowledge, and even our capacity to prosper.
NOTES
1 March and Olsen (1995) conclude that the myth is
useful largely as a motivator for individuals to do
their best. The arguments that individual
accountability is a myth and that it is useful only as a
motivator are both open to challenge.
2 Economists usually distinguish further between
allocative efficiency, or movement towards the
productivity possibilities curve, and dynamic
efficiency, the outward movement of the production
possibilities curve.
3 There are an estimated 175,000 not-for-proﬁt
organizations in Canada, and estimates of their
contribution to GDP range from 4 to over 12
percent, depending on how the sector is deﬁned (Day
and Devlin 1997; Sharpe 1994). The sector employs
at least 9 percent of the workforce, accounting for
more employment, salaries and beneﬁts than sectors
such as construction, real estate, ﬁnance and
insurance (Canadian Policy Research Networks and
Canadian Centre for Philanthropy [CPRN and CCP]
1998; Sharpe 1994). These data underestimate due
to the way Statistics Canada has traditionally
collected information. Approximately 100,000 not-
for-proﬁts are not captured by existing data (Quarter
1992).
4 There is little consensus on what constitutes the
voluntary sector and whether indeed there is a single
sector. It has been variously described as “charitable,”
“non-proﬁt,” “not-for-proﬁt” and “voluntary.”
Generally, the voluntary sector encompasses those
organizations that are neither part of the state nor
private market-based organizations.
5 Salamon and Anheier (1997) consider not-for-proﬁt
organizations to be: (1) organized; (2) private, or
institutionally separate from government; (3) self-
governing; (4) non-proﬁt-distributing — that is, they
do not return proﬁts to owners or directors; 
(5) voluntary — that is, their management or
operation involves some degree of voluntary
participation. See also CPRN and CCP (1998) and
Febbraro et al. (1999).
6 The line between the public and voluntary sectors
tends to blur at the edges, and the classiﬁcation of
individual organizations is controversial. Some, for
example, include hospitals and schools within the
voluntary sector, while others classify these within
what has come to be called the “broader public
sector.” Canadian studies have generally separated
out the large “statutory” not-for-proﬁt institutions
such as hospitals and universities from the rest
(Sharpe 1994). For our purposes, what matters is that
both sectors deliver public services.
7 One of the anonymous reviewers made exactly this
kind of comment.
8 It is interesting to note, in this context, that the
increase in the fear of biowarfare was not based on
any change in probabilities, since the probabilities
could not be calculated. Rather, experts updated in
response to a single salient event. This is a common
cognitive error in judgement among experts.
9 The reduction in public-sector capacity in the mid-
1990s in Canada was driven by an acute ﬁscal crisis.
Irrespective of the motivation, the cuts severely
reduced the capacity of the public sector to deal with
unexpected contingencies. The scope of the problem
became apparent in the wake of September 11 as
governments assessed their capacity to respond.
10 Arguably, it was not productivity arguments but
cost-cutting which ignored productivity issues that
led to the reduction of nurses in the health-care
system across Canada.
11 Analysts of health care, for example, are increasingly
dependent on the valuable information provided by the
Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI).
12 From the ﬁnancial data provided by Revenue Canada,
it is not possible to separate out the revenues that not-
for-proﬁts earn in relation to government contracts
from their other sources of government revenue. The
not-for-proﬁts have become the government’s preferred
supplier for many social services where outputs are
difficult to deﬁne (CPRN and CCP 1998, 24). Total
federal grants to national organizations and provincial
grants to not-for-proﬁts grew 4.5 percent annually
from 1994 to 1997. In Ontario, in 2000-2001,
approximately $9 billion was transferred to 10,000
not-for-proﬁts that provided over 200 programs in 19
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universities. In Ontario, there has been an increase of
227 percent in the past decade in the contracting of
not-for-proﬁts to deliver public services. (Interview,
Ontario Public Services, 27 June 2002.)
13 There are, of course, important exceptions. In Canada,
the Centre for Voluntary Sector Research and
Development is a partnership of the voluntary sector,
the University of Ottawa and Carleton University to
undertake collaborative research on governance, policy
and management. The Peter F. Drucker Canadian
Foundation seeks to recognize innovative work in the
not-for-proﬁt sector. The Masters of Management for
National Voluntary Sector Leaders is delivered through
a partnership between McGill University and the J.W.
McConnell Family Foundation; it has played a
leadership role in educating leaders and building
capacity across the sector to share knowledge.
14 The American United Way Movement is now
exploring the creation of a National Center of
Excellence through a strategic partnership with a
major university in the United States. Its mandate
would be to develop new strategies, practices and
products in partnership with local United Ways,
conduct focused research, and publish relevant studies
and reports. Such a Center, with a projected annual
budget of $15 million, would begin to speak directly
to the gap in investment in R&D. Currently, the
United Way of Toronto is beginning to explore the
creation of a Centre for Excellence in Innovation and
Knowledge (United Way of Greater Toronto 2002).
15 I use these concepts somewhat differently from
others who write about vertical and horizontal
accountability. See O’Donnell (1999), Schmitter
(1999) and Keohane (2002).
16 The title of a recent article reviewing the sector,
“What We Should Know About the Voluntary
Sector but Don’t,” is illuminating (Dreessen 2001).
Dreessen argues that the gaps in knowledge about
the voluntary sector in Canada are so large that the
sector cannot effectively be mapped.
17 A third challenge is the seemingly trivial issue of the
reporting requirements established by funders. As
government and other donors move increasingly to
fund programs, it becomes more difficult to ﬁnance
expert staff and other overhead. The reporting demands
in parts of the voluntary sector have become so onerous
in the last decade that many agencies do not have
adequate staff to meet the demand. This is especially
true for agencies that are engaged directly in service
delivery. One small agency in Toronto revealed that it
had to complete more than 140 reports to funders last
year. The agency could not afford the professional staff
required to meet the complex reporting requirements.
There is a serious shortage of capacity in the voluntary
sector that delivers public services to local
communities, in terms of both available staff and levels
of knowledge and skills.
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